Commit Graph

24 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
epriestley
42e5b8a04b Include the primary domain in the Content-Security-Policy explicitly if there's no CDN
Summary:
Ref T4340. If you don't configure a CDN and visit a custom site (like a Phame blog site, or a CORGI sandbox internally) we serve resources from the main site. This violates the Content-Security-Policy.

When there's no CDN, include the primary domain in the CSP explicitly.

Test Plan: Loaded `local.www.phacility.com`, got resources.

Maniphest Tasks: T4340

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19170
2018-03-02 07:42:29 -08:00
epriestley
94d340fcff Include OAuth targets in "form-action" Content-Security-Policy
Summary:
Ref T4340. Some "Register/Login" and "Link External Account" buttons are forms which submit to third-party sites. Whitelist these targets when pages render an OAuth form.

Safari, at least, also prevents a redirect to a third-party domain after a form submission to the local domain, so when we first redirect locally (as with Twitter and other OAuth1 providers) we need to authorize an additional URI.

Test Plan: Clicked all my registration buttons locally without hitting CSP issues.

Maniphest Tasks: T4340

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19159
2018-02-28 19:28:35 -08:00
epriestley
d5befb1a0e Block use of "<base />" in the Content Security Policy
Summary: Ref T4340. We don't use "<base />" so we can safely block it.

Test Plan: Injected "<base />" into a page, saw an error in the console showing that the browser had blocked it.

Maniphest Tasks: T4340

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19158
2018-02-28 18:56:57 -08:00
epriestley
ab579f2511 Never generate file download forms which point to the CDN domain, tighten "form-action" CSP
Summary:
Depends on D19155. Ref T13094. Ref T4340.

We can't currently implement a strict `form-action 'self'` content security policy because some file downloads rely on a `<form />` which sometimes POSTs to the CDN domain.

Broadly, stop generating these forms. We just redirect instead, and show an interstitial confirm dialog if no CDN domain is configured. This makes the UX for installs with no CDN domain a little worse and the UX for everyone else better.

Then, implement the stricter Content-Security-Policy.

This also removes extra confirm dialogs for downloading Harbormaster build logs and data exports.

Test Plan:
  - Went through the plain data export, data export with bulk jobs, ssh key generation, calendar ICS download, Diffusion data, Paste data, Harbormaster log data, and normal file data download workflows with a CDN domain.
  - Went through all those workflows again without a CDN domain.
  - Grepped for affected symbols (`getCDNURI()`, `getDownloadURI()`).
  - Added an evil form to a page, tried to submit it, was rejected.
  - Went through the ReCaptcha and Stripe flows again to see if they're submitting any forms.

Subscribers: PHID-OPKG-gm6ozazyms6q6i22gyam

Maniphest Tasks: T13094, T4340

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19156
2018-02-28 17:20:12 -08:00
epriestley
a5efd7eedb Add "object-src 'none'" to the Content-Security-Policy
Summary: See PHI399. Ref T4340. We don't require Flash/Java anywhere and can safely block them unconditionally in the Content-Security-Policy header.

Test Plan: Added a `<object ... />` tag to a page, saw "Blocked Plug-In" and a CSP warning in the browser console.

Maniphest Tasks: T4340

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19154
2018-02-28 17:19:26 -08:00
epriestley
9658249ac5 Add "Referrer-Policy: no-referrer" to standard HTTP headers
Summary:
Ref T4340. Some browsers respect this header and referrers are a plague upon the earth.

Also, upgrade "never" to the more modern value "no-referrer".

Test Plan:
In Safari, Firefox and Chrome, disabled `rel="noreferrer"` on links and generated a normal link to an external site. Then clicked it and checked if a referrer was sent.

  - Safari respects meta only, but "no-referrer" is fine.
  - Firefox respects both (either the header or meta tag are individually sufficient to stop referrers).
  - Chrome respects both (same as Firefox).

Maniphest Tasks: T4340

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19144
2018-02-27 12:59:41 -08:00
epriestley
dba4c4bdf6 Emit a "Content-Security-Policy" HTTP header
Summary:
See PHI399. Ref T4340. This header provides an additional layer of protection against various attacks, including XSS attacks which embed inline `<script ...>` or `onhover="..."` content into the document.

**style-src**: The "unsafe-inline" directive affects both `style="..."` and `<style>`. We use a lot of `style="..."`, some very legitimately, so we can't realistically get away from this any time soon. We only use one `<style>` (for monospaced font preferences) but can't disable `<style>` without disabling `style="..."`.

**img-src**: We use "data:" URIs to inline small images into CSS, and there's a significant performance benefit from doing this. There doesn't seem to be a way to allow "data" URIs in CSS without allowing them in the document itself.

**script-src** and **frame-src**: For a small number of flows (Recaptcha, Stripe) we embed external javascript, some of which embeds child elements (or additional resources) into the document. We now whitelist these narrowly on the respective pages.

This won't work with Quicksand, so I've blacklisted it for now.

**connect-src**: We need to include `'self'` for AJAX to work, and any websocket URIs.

**Clickjacking**: We now have three layers of protection:

  - X-Frame-Options: works in older browsers.
  - `frame-ancestors 'none'`: does the same thing.
  - Explicit framebust in JX.Stratcom after initialization: works in ancient IE.

We could probably drop the explicit framebust but it wasn't difficult to retain.

**script tags**: We previously used an inline `<script>` tag to start Javelin. I've moved this to `<data data-javelin-init ...>` tags, which seems to work properly.

**`__DEV__`**: We previously used an inline `<script>` tag to set the `__DEV__` mode flag. I tried using the "initialization" tags for this, but they fire too late. I moved it to `<html data-developer-mode="1">`, which seems OK everywhere.

**CSP Scope**: Only the CSP header on the original request appears to matter -- you can't refine the scope by emitting headers on CSS/JS. To reduce confusion, I disabled the headers on those response types. More headers could be disabled, although we're likely already deep in the land of diminishing returns.

**Initialization**: The initialization sequence has changed slightly. Previously, we waited for the <script> in bottom of the document to evaluate. Now, we go fishing for tags when domcontentready fires.

Test Plan:
  - Browsed around in Firefox, Safari and Chrome looking for console warnings. Interacted with various Javascript behaviors. Enabled Quicksand.
  - Disabled all the framebusting, launched a clickjacking attack, verified that each layer of protection is individually effective.
  - Verified that the XHProf iframe in Darkconsole and the PHPAST frame layout work properly.
  - Enabled notifications, verified no complaints about connecting to Aphlict.
  - Hit `__DEV__` mode warnings based on the new data attribute.
  - Tried to do sketchy stuff with `data:` URIs and SVGs. This works but doesn't seem to be able to do anything dangerous.
  - Went through the Stripe and Recaptcha workflows.
  - Dumped and examined the CSP headers with `curl`, etc.
  - Added a raw <script> tag to a page (as though I'd found an XSS attack), verified it was no longer executed.

Maniphest Tasks: T4340

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D19143
2018-02-27 10:17:30 -08:00
epriestley
842710608e Don't combine automatic output compression with "Content-Length"
Summary:
Fixes T12013. Send either "Content-Length" or enable output compression, but not both.

Prefer compression for static resources (CSS, JS, etc).

Test Plan: Ran `curl -v ...`, no longer saw responses with both compression and `Content-Length`.

Reviewers: chad, avivey

Reviewed By: avivey

Subscribers: avivey

Maniphest Tasks: T12013

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D17045
2016-12-13 14:25:49 -08:00
epriestley
90294713e8 Use phutil_json_encode() in AphrontResponse to raise better errors
Summary:
Ref T11524. This problem was more difficult to diagnose than necessary because we swallow errors silently in `AphontResponse` when emitting JSON responses.

Instead of using `json_encode()`, use `phutil_json_encode()` which throws on failure.

Test Plan:
Old behavior was HTTP 200 with no body.

New behavior is HTTP 500 with this message:

```
[2016-08-26 07:33:59] EXCEPTION: (HTTPFutureHTTPResponseStatus) [HTTP/500] Internal Server Error
Exception: Failed to JSON encode value (#5: Malformed UTF-8 characters, possibly incorrectly encoded): Dictionary value at key &quot;result&quot; is not valid UTF8, and cannot be JSON encoded: diff --git a/latin1.txt b/latin1.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ce6c927
--- /dev/null
+++ b/latin1.txt
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+&lt;�&gt;
. at [<phutil>/src/future/http/BaseHTTPFuture.php:339]
```

Reviewers: chad, avivey

Reviewed By: avivey

Maniphest Tasks: T11524

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16457
2016-08-26 07:39:22 -07:00
epriestley
5664c838fb Reduce thumbnail flickering in comment previews
Summary:
Ref T10262. Currently, we always render a tag like this when you `{F123}` an image in remarkup:

```
<img src="/xform/preview/abcdef/" />
```

This either generates the preview or redirects to an existing preview. This is a good behavior in general, because the preview may take a while to generate and we don't want to wait for it to generate on the server side.

However, this flickers a lot in Safari. We might be able to cache this, but we really shouldn't, since the preview URI isn't a legitimately stable/permanent one.

Instead, do a (cheap) server-side check to see if the preview already exists. If it does, return a direct URI. This gives us a stable thumbnail in Safari.

Test Plan:
  - Dragged a dog picture into comment box.
  - Typed text.
  - Thing didn't flicker like crazy all the time in Safari.

Reviewers: chad

Reviewed By: chad

Maniphest Tasks: T10262

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15646
2016-04-06 15:52:52 -07:00
epriestley
439821c7b2 Don't require one-time tokens to view file resources
Summary:
Ref T10262. This removes one-time tokens and makes file data responses always-cacheable (for 30 days).

The URI will stop working once any attached object changes its view policy, or the file view policy itself changes.

Files with `canCDN` (totally public data like profile images, CSS, JS, etc) use "cache-control: public" so they can be CDN'd.

Files without `canCDN` use "cache-control: private" so they won't be cached by the CDN. They could still be cached by a misbehaving local cache, but if you don't want your users seeing one anothers' secret files you should configure your local network properly.

Our "Cache-Control" headers were also from 1999 or something, update them to be more modern/sane. I can't find any evidence that any browser has done the wrong thing with this simpler ruleset in the last ~10 years.

Test Plan:
  - Configured alternate file domain.
  - Viewed site: stuff worked.
  - Accessed a file on primary domain, got redirected to alternate domain.
  - Verified proper cache headers for `canCDN` (public) and non-`canCDN` (private) files.
  - Uploaded a file to a task, edited task policy, verified it scrambled the old URI.
  - Reloaded task, new URI generated transparently.

Reviewers: chad

Reviewed By: chad

Maniphest Tasks: T10262

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15642
2016-04-06 14:14:36 -07:00
Joshua Spence
b6d745b666 Extend from Phobject
Summary: All classes should extend from some other class. See D13275 for some explanation.

Test Plan: `arc unit`

Reviewers: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers

Reviewed By: epriestley, #blessed_reviewers

Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D13283
2015-06-15 18:02:27 +10:00
Joshua Spence
acb45968d8 Use __CLASS__ instead of hard-coding class names
Summary: Use `__CLASS__` instead of hard-coding class names. Depends on D12605.

Test Plan: Eyeball it.

Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley

Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley

Subscribers: hach-que, Korvin, epriestley

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D12806
2015-05-14 07:21:13 +10:00
Joshua Spence
b2c23d88e8 Implement HTTP response messages
Summary: Fixes T7486. Implement HTTP response messages such as `200 OK` and `404 Not Found`. The status codes were taken from http://www.w3.org/Protocols/rfc2616/rfc2616-sec10.html.

Test Plan: Navigated to `/foo` and saw the response showing `404 Not Found` in the Network tab of Chrome.

Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley

Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley

Subscribers: Korvin, epriestley

Maniphest Tasks: T7486

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D12299
2015-04-07 07:41:32 +10:00
epriestley
81d88985a0 Prepare file responses for streaming chunks
Summary:
Ref T7149. This still buffers the whole file, but is reaaaaal close to not doing that.

Allow Responses to be streamed, and rewrite the range stuff in the FileResponse so it does not rely on having the entire content available.

Test Plan:
  - Artificially slowed down downloads, suspended/resumed them (works in chrome, not so much in Safari/Firefox?)
  - Played sounds in Safari/Chrome.
  - Viewed a bunch of pages and files in every browser.

Reviewers: btrahan

Reviewed By: btrahan

Subscribers: joshuaspence, epriestley

Maniphest Tasks: T7149

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D12072
2015-03-14 08:29:12 -07:00
epriestley
751ffe123d Support HTTP Strict Transport Security
Summary:
Ref T4340. The attack this prevents is:

  - An adversary penetrates your network. They acquire one of two capabilities:
    - Your server is either configured to accept both HTTP and HTTPS, and they acquire the capability to observe HTTP traffic.
    - Or your server is configured to accept only HTTPS, and they acquire the capability to control DNS or routing. In this case, they start a proxy server to expose your secure service over HTTP.
  - They send you a link to `http://secure.service.com` (note HTTP, not HTTPS!)
  - You click it since everything looks fine and the domain is correct, not noticing that the "s" is missing.
  - They read your traffic.

This is similar to attacks where `https://good.service.com` is proxied to `https://good.sorvace.com` (i.e., a similar looking domain), but can be more dangerous -- for example, the browser will send (non-SSL-only) cookies and the attacker can write cookies.

This header instructs browsers that they can never access the site over HTTP and must always use HTTPS, defusing this class of attack.

Test Plan:
  - Configured HTTPS locally.
  - Accessed site over HTTP (got application redirect) and HTTPS.
  - Enabled HSTS.
  - Accessed site over HTTPS (to set HSTS).
  - Tore down HTTPS part of the server and tried to load the site over HTTP. Browser refused to load "http://" and automatically tried to load "https://". In another browser which had not received the "HSTS" header, loading over HTTP worked fine.
  - Brought the HTTPS server back up, things worked fine.
  - Turned off the HSTS config setting.
  - Loaded a page (to set HSTS with expires 0, diabling it).
  - Tore down the HTTPS part of the server again.
  - Tried to load HTTP.
  - Now it worked.

Reviewers: btrahan

Reviewed By: btrahan

Subscribers: epriestley

Maniphest Tasks: T4340

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D11820
2015-02-19 10:33:48 -08:00
Joshua Spence
3cf9a5820f Minor formatting changes
Summary: Apply some autofix linter rules.

Test Plan: `arc lint` and `arc unit`

Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley

Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley

Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10585
2014-10-08 08:39:49 +11:00
Joshua Spence
8756d82cf6 Remove @group annotations
Summary: I'm pretty sure that `@group` annotations are useless now... see D9855. Also fixed various other minor issues.

Test Plan: Eye-ball it.

Reviewers: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley, chad

Reviewed By: #blessed_reviewers, epriestley

Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin, hach-que

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9859
2014-07-10 08:12:48 +10:00
epriestley
c7f23f522a Accept and route VCS HTTP requests
Summary:
Mostly ripped from D7391, with some changes:

  - Serve repositories at `/diffusion/X/`, with no special `/git/` or `/serve/` URI component.
    - This requires a little bit of magic, but I got the magic working for Git, Mercurial and SVN, and it seems reasonable.
    - I think having one URI for everything will make it easier for users to understand.
    - One downside is that git will clone into `X` by default, but I think that's not a big deal, and we can work around that in the future easily enough.
  - Accept HTTP requests for Git, SVN and Mercurial repositories.
  - Auth logic is a little different in order to be more consistent with how other things work.
  - Instead of AphrontBasicAuthResponse, added "VCSResponse". Mercurial can print strings we send it on the CLI if we're careful, so support that. I did a fair amount of digging and didn't have any luck with git or svn.
  - Commands we don't know about are assumed to require "Push" capability by default.

No actual VCS data going over the wire yet.

Test Plan:
Ran a bunch of stuff like this:

  $ hg clone http://local.aphront.com:8080/diffusion/P/
  abort: HTTP Error 403: This repository is not available over HTTP.

...and got pretty reasonable-seeming errors in all cases. All this can do is produce errors for now.

Reviewers: hach-que, btrahan

Reviewed By: hach-que

CC: aran

Maniphest Tasks: T2230

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D7417
2013-10-29 15:32:40 -07:00
epriestley
5e53fc750a Fix some ObjectItemList issues
Summary:
Safari has a weird bug with `border-radius` plus border color:

{F35865}

Move the uncolored borders to an internal div to fix this. Also tweak some positioning on icons for cards, and add a "magenta" color.

Test Plan: {F35866}

Reviewers: chad, btrahan

Reviewed By: chad

CC: aran

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D5338
2013-03-23 14:37:18 -07:00
epriestley
fc4cb57357 Fix JSON encoding of PhutilSafeHTML for browser consumption
Summary:
If you run this code:

  json_encode(array('tag' => phutil_tag('div', array())));

...you get this result, because json_encode() does not call toString() on objects:

  {"tag":{}}

Instead, convert such objects to their underlying strings. Javelin has support for JX.HTML and for implicit conversion (which is kind of sketchy for other reasons) but it's sort of complicated (only happens on Ajax, not behaviors) and messy (not metadata-based), so ignore it for now.

We'll need to do something similar for serialization to the database. My plan there is just to throw on any objects. The only time we put HTML in the database is cache-related and those tiny number of callsites can manually handle it.

Test Plan: Various ajax things now receive the correct data.

Reviewers: vrana

Reviewed By: vrana

CC: aran

Maniphest Tasks: T2432

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D4684
2013-01-28 18:11:27 -08:00
vrana
ef85f49adc Delete license headers from files
Summary:
This commit doesn't change license of any file. It just makes the license implicit (inherited from LICENSE file in the root directory).

We are removing the headers for these reasons:

- It wastes space in editors, less code is visible in editor upon opening a file.
- It brings noise to diff of the first change of any file every year.
- It confuses Git file copy detection when creating small files.
- We don't have an explicit license header in other files (JS, CSS, images, documentation).
- Using license header in every file is not obligatory: http://www.apache.org/dev/apply-license.html#new.

This change is approved by Alma Chao (Lead Open Source and IP Counsel at Facebook).

Test Plan: Verified that the license survived only in LICENSE file and that it didn't modify externals.

Reviewers: epriestley, davidrecordon

Reviewed By: epriestley

CC: aran, Korvin

Maniphest Tasks: T2035

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D3886
2012-11-05 11:16:51 -08:00
Bob Trahan
7bb3c39cde Polish removal of conduit shield, including legacy stripping for phabricator on phabricator oauth scenarios
Summary: ...just in case that stuff happens in the "wild". also cleaned up the logic here since we no longer have the conduit conditionality.

Test Plan: made sure I didn't break JS on the site. reasoned about logic of my function and asking people PHP typing questions in job interviews.

Reviewers: epriestley, vrana

Reviewed By: epriestley

CC: aran, Korvin

Maniphest Tasks: T891

Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D3269
2012-08-13 16:05:56 -07:00
vrana
6cc196a2e5 Move files in Phabricator one level up
Summary:
- `kill_init.php` said "Moving 1000 files" - I hope that this is not some limit in `FileFinder`.
- [src/infrastructure/celerity] `git mv utils.php map.php; git mv api/utils.php api.php`
- Comment `phutil_libraries` in `.arcconfig` and run `arc liberate`.

NOTE: `arc diff` timed out so I'm pushing it without review.

Test Plan:
/D1234
Browsed around, especially in `applications/repository/worker/commitchangeparser` and `applications/` in general.

Auditors: epriestley

Maniphest Tasks: T1103
2012-06-01 12:32:44 -07:00