Summary: Fixes T11107. The URI change here meant we were dropping the "key" parameter, which allows you to set a new password without knowing your old one.
Test Plan: Reset password, didn't need to provide old one anymore.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T11107
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D16075
Summary:
Ref T10603. This makes minor updates to temporary tokens:
- Rename `objectPHID` (which is sometimes used to store some other kind of identifier instead of a PHID) to `tokenResource` (i.e., which resource does this token permit access to?).
- Add a `userPHID` column. For LFS tokens and some other types of tokens, I want to bind the token to both a resource (like a repository) and a user.
- Add a `properties` column. This makes tokens more flexible and supports custom behavior (like scoping LFS tokens even more tightly).
Test Plan:
- Ran `bin/storage upgrade -f`, got a clean upgrade.
- Viewed one-time tokens.
- Revoked one token.
- Revoked all tokens.
- Performed a one-time login.
- Performed a password reset.
- Added an MFA token.
- Removed an MFA token.
- Used a file token to view a file.
- Verified file token was removed after viewing file.
- Linked my account to an OAuth1 account (Twitter).
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15478
Summary:
Ref T10603. This converts existing hard-codes to modular constants.
Also removes one small piece of code duplication.
Test Plan:
- Performed one-time logins.
- Performed a password reset.
- Verified temporary tokens were revoked properly.
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T10603
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D15476
Summary:
Fixes T9610.
- We currently permit you to `bin/auth recover` users who can not establish web sessions (but this will never work). Prevent this.
- We don't emit a tailored error if you follow one of these links. Tailor the error.
Even with the first fix, you can still hit the second case by doing something like:
- Recover a normal user.
- Make them a mailing list in the DB.
- Follow the recovery link.
The original issue here was an install that did a large migration and set all users to be mailing lists. Normal installs should never encounter this, but it's not wholly unreasonable to have daemons or mailing lists with the administrator flag.
Test Plan:
- Tried to follow a recovery link for a mailing list.
- Tried to generate a recovery link for a mailing list.
- Generated and followed a recovery link for a normal administrator.
{F906342}
```
epriestley@orbital ~/dev/phabricator $ ./bin/auth recover tortise-list
Usage Exception: This account ("tortise-list") can not establish web sessions, so it is not possible to generate a functional recovery link. Special accounts like daemons and mailing lists can not log in via the web UI.
```
Reviewers: chad
Reviewed By: chad
Maniphest Tasks: T9610
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D14325
Summary: Fixes T9046. These got swapped around during refactoring.
Test Plan:
- Used `bin/auth recover` prior to patch (failed).
- Used `bin/auth recover` after patch (worked).
Reviewers: joshuaspence, chad
Reviewed By: chad
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T9046
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D13778
Summary: Updates Auth app for handleRequest
Test Plan: Tested what I could, Log in, Log out, Change Password, New account, Verify account... but extra eyes very helpful here.
Reviewers: epriestley
Reviewed By: epriestley
Subscribers: epriestley, Korvin
Maniphest Tasks: T8628
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D13748
Summary:
Fixes T5900. We have some very old code here which does not let you update your password if the `account.editable` flag is set.
This was approximately introduced in D890, and I think it was mostly copy/pasted at that point. I'm not sure this ever really made sense. The option is not documented as affecting this, for example. In the modern environment of auth providers, it definitely does not make sense.
Instead, always allow users to change passwords if the install has a password provider configured.
Test Plan:
- Set `account.editable` to false.
- Used a password reset link.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T5900
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10331
Summary:
Via HackerOne. If a user adds an email address and typos it, entering `alinculne@gmailo.com`, and it happens to be a valid address which an evil user controls, the evil user can request a password reset and compromise the account.
This strains the imagination, but we can implement a better behavior cheaply.
- If an account has any verified addresses, only send to verified addresses.
- If an account has no verified addresses (e.g., is a new account), send to any address.
We've also received several reports about reset links not being destroyed as aggressively as researchers expect. While there's no specific scenario where this does any harm, revoke all outstanding reset tokens when a reset link is used to improve the signal/noise ratio of the reporting channel.
Test Plan:
- Tried to send a reset link to an unverified address on an account with a verified address (got new error).
- Tried to send a reset link to a verified adddress on an account with a verified address (got email).
- Tried to send a reset link to an invalid address (got old error).
- Tried to send a reset link to an unverified address on an account with only unverified addresses -- a new user (got email).
- Requested several reset links, used one, verified all the others were revoked.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D10206
Summary: Both email verify and welcome links now verify email, centralize them and record them in the user activity log.
Test Plan:
- Followed a "verify email" link and got verified.
- Followed a "welcome" (verifying) link.
- Followed a "reset" (non-verifying) link.
- Looked in the activity log for the verifications.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9284
Summary:
Ref T4398. This code hadn't been touched in a while and had a few crufty bits.
**One Time Resets**: Currently, password reset (and similar links) are valid for about 48 hours, but we always use one token to generate them (it's bound to the account). This isn't horrible, but it could be better, and it produces a lot of false positives on HackerOne.
Instead, use TemporaryTokens to make each link one-time only and good for no more than 24 hours.
**Coupling of Email Verification and One-Time Login**: Currently, one-time login links ("password reset links") are tightly bound to an email address, and using a link verifies that email address.
This is convenient for "Welcome" emails, so the user doesn't need to go through two rounds of checking email in order to login, then very their email, then actually get access to Phabricator.
However, for other types of these links (like those generated by `bin/auth recover`) there's no need to do any email verification.
Instead, make the email verification part optional, and use it on welcome links but not other types of links.
**Message Customization**: These links can come out of several workflows: welcome, password reset, username change, or `bin/auth recover`. Add a hint to the URI so the text on the page can be customized a bit to help users through the workflow.
**Reset Emails Going to Main Account Email**: Previously, we would send password reset email to the user's primary account email. However, since we verify email coming from reset links this isn't correct and could allow a user to verify an email without actually controlling it.
Since the user needs a real account in the first place this does not seem useful on its own, but might be a component in some other attack. The user might also no longer have access to their primary account, in which case this wouldn't be wrong, but would not be very useful.
Mitigate this in two ways:
- First, send to the actual email address the user entered, not the primary account email address.
- Second, don't let these links verify emails: they're just login links. This primarily makes it more difficult for an attacker to add someone else's email to their account, send them a reset link, get them to login and implicitly verify the email by not reading very carefully, and then figure out something interesting to do (there's currently no followup attack here, but allowing this does seem undesirable).
**Password Reset Without Old Password**: After a user logs in via email, we send them to the password settings panel (if passwords are enabled) with a code that lets them set a new password without knowing the old one.
Previously, this code was static and based on the email address. Instead, issue a one-time code.
**Jump Into Hisec**: Normally, when a user who has multi-factor auth on their account logs in, we prompt them for factors but don't put them in high security. You usually don't want to go do high-security stuff immediately after login, and it would be confusing and annoying if normal logins gave you a "YOU ARE IN HIGH SECURITY" alert bubble.
However, if we're taking you to the password reset screen, we //do// want to put the user in high security, since that screen requires high security. If we don't do this, the user gets two factor prompts in a row.
To accomplish this, we set a cookie when we know we're sending the user into a high security workflow. This cookie makes login finalization upgrade all the way from "partial" to "high security", instead of stopping halfway at "normal". This is safe because the user has just passed a factor check; the only reason we don't normally do this is to reduce annoyance.
**Some UI Cleanup**: Some of this was using really old UI. Modernize it a bit.
Test Plan:
- **One Time Resets**
- Used a reset link.
- Tried to reuse a reset link, got denied.
- Verified each link is different.
- **Coupling of Email Verification and One-Time Login**
- Verified that `bin/auth`, password reset, and username change links do not have an email verifying URI component.
- Tried to tack one on, got denied.
- Used the welcome email link to login + verify.
- Tried to mutate the URI to not verify, or verify something else: got denied.
- **Message Customization**
- Viewed messages on the different workflows. They seemed OK.
- **Reset Emails Going to Main Account Email**
- Sent password reset email to non-primary email.
- Received email at specified address.
- Verified it does not verify the address.
- **Password Reset Without Old Password**
- Reset password without knowledge of old one after email reset.
- Tried to do that without a key, got denied.
- Tried to reuse a key, got denied.
- **Jump Into Hisec**
- Logged in with MFA user, got factor'd, jumped directly into hisec.
- Logged in with non-MFA user, no factors, normal password reset.
- **Some UI Cleanup**
- Viewed new UI.
- **Misc**
- Created accounts, logged in with welcome link, got verified.
- Changed a username, used link to log back in.
Reviewers: btrahan
Reviewed By: btrahan
Subscribers: epriestley
Maniphest Tasks: T4398
Differential Revision: https://secure.phabricator.com/D9252
